Post-socialist Transition and Empirical Evaluation of the Future Spatial Development of Serbia

MIODRAG VUJOŠEVIĆ, PhD, SLAVKA ZEKOVIĆ, PhD, TAMARA MARIČIĆ, MSc
Institute of Architecture and Urban & Spatial Planning of Serbia
11000 Belgrade, Bulevar kralja Aleksandra 73/II
SERBIA

misav@iaus.ac.rs, zeksbmv@eunet.rs, tamara@iaus.ac.rs, http://www.iaus.ac.rs

Abstract. Due to different political and economic factors during its post-socialist transition Serbia has been isolated from the mainstream trends of European integration and convergence. The country’s comparative advantages and competitiveness have worsened in two key aspects - in its structural qualities and in its territorial capital. The economic recovery after the changes in 2000 onwards has the form of “growth without development”, while the spatial development patterns have appeared to be rather unsustainable. Today, Serbia has found itself in the position of an economic, ecological and financial semi-colony of few powerful international political, economic and financial actors. In the last part, we will present results of an empiric evaluation of the three scenarios for spatial development of Serbia until 2020 based on comparative analysis of 29 indicators by applying the Spider method.

Key-words: post-socialist transition, Serbia, territorial capital, unsustainable spatial development, institutional arrangements, spatial development scenarios, Spider method

1 Introduction
Since 2000, considerable material and institutional progress has been accomplished in Serbia. Overall progress has still fallen short of the expectations of the overwhelming majority of the population. Although dynamic economic growth has taken place (at an average annual growth of GDP 5%), grossly it has not been directed toward spatial and ecological sustainability, and has thus largely perpetuated many deficiencies of the obsolete “paleo-industrial” structure of the Serbian economy and services, making the problems of future economic, ecological and other restructuring even more complicated. Often this direction has varied from that of the mainstream development scene in the EU, a direction also reflected in the most recent generation of European documents of sustainable development [1]. Although transition reforms in Serbia have progressed, the political legitimacy of reforms is poor, since veritable societal dialogue has not been established so far either, nor has societal consensus been reached on the key issues. Serbia has followed a path of “economic growth without development”, largely as a result of the poor legitimacy of transition reforms and an unsustainable development pattern. Territorial capital of Serbia has shrunk, and is still endangered (for general discussion on the notion of territorial capital and concepts see [2,3,4,5,6,7,8]).

Until very recently, the legitimacy of strategic planning has nearly been lost, largely because of this lack of political dialogue on broader social issues. In sum, Serbia, still one of the most un-developed European countries, faces a vast number of very complex developmental problems and many challenges. Its development prospects, at least over a mid-term period, are not bright. Perhaps a more pessimistic development scenario (“Cassandra”) is more plausible than a bright one (“Pollyanna”) [1]. For that very reason, more strategic thinking and research is needed so that the predictable future prospects of Serbia are preferably based on various development scenarios.

In this paper, we first discuss key problems of post-socialist transition in Serbia, as reflected in its existing level of development, and which are also commented upon from the standpoint of sustainable development. We then discuss some basic elements of the prospective future through the use of the scenario approach. Following that, we consider future development scenarios, outlining and evaluating three scenarios of territorial development of Serbia till 2020 by applying the method Spider,
and in the final part we compare Serbia and the EU-27 by the indicators of spatial development.

2 Post-socialist transition in Serbia
The unfortunate events following the late 1980s and the early 1990s directed Serbia towards rather bleak development prospects. The comparative advantages and competitiveness of Serbia have worsened in two key aspects, that is, in terms of its structural qualities (1) and in terms of its territorial capital (2), whereby the country’s “endogenous capital” and competitiveness lost a large part of their value and potential. Especially has worsened the so-called “soft territorial capital”, in parallel with the disappearing capacity for strategic research, thinking and governance. In particular, Serbia grossly missed the wave of the so-called “economic and ecological modernization” that took place in the EU, which left the country lagging even further behind contemporary mainstream trends. Thus, Serbia “moored” even deeper in the periphery of Europe, as it became a part of new „inner peripheries” of Europe. The economic recovery from 2000 onwards, while fairly dynamic, has still been insufficient, and more or less assumed the form of “growth without development”. This direction has largely perpetuated many deficiencies of the obsolete “paleo-industrial” structure of the Serbian economy and services, making the problems of future economic, ecological and other restructuring even more complicated. Consequently, Serbia still shelters one of the most dissipating and non-sustainable economies and social services in Europe, paralleled by inadequate spatial development patterns. Now, the country has found itself in the position of an economic, ecological and financial (debtor) semi-colony of few influential international political, economic and financial actors, also reflecting the ideological model of post-socialist transition reforms chosen [27].

In socio-political terms, the results the „post-self-governing-socialistic” transition in Serbia have been described as a “process of transition from one disaster to another”, as “post socialist capitalism as the last phase of capitalism”, as “a part of new ‘wild East’”, as an “economy of destruction that covers a bumbling abyss between consumption and production”, etc. [11], even in a more picturesque ways as “…a country which is now already too long nailed down under the lower deck of Europe“ [28].

After almost two decades of reforms, with ups and downs, great numbers of people are the objective losers due to an application of contemporary models. Serbia’s own industrial production was nearly destroyed and its citizens disempowered, ridden of property in many sectors of real economy, disqualified and unemployed. On the other hand, a majority of the winners are opposed to any further sequence of reforms, while there is still no basic political consensus on goals, content and modalities of transitional reforms. The main economic consequence of this period is a stunning redistribution of social wealth, accompanied by a total destruction of the former economic system and the creation of new interest groups formed in an isolated semi-martial economy. This redistribution has been made on several occasions, where the state machinery was the moderator between citizens and a narrow circle of the ruling political party and its satraps. Since 2000 there have been attempts to improve the effects of that economic distribution by means like a tax on extra profit, but they were unsuccessful due to the absence of other measures of political transition: the reform of the tribunal, prosecution, restitution and denationalization.

It has been shown that “pink scenarios” are impossible to achieve in a fast and easy way, which points again to the difficulties and complexity of the social, political and economic social realms. A significant contribution to the problem is the fact that the government in Serbia from the end of the 1980s until today, and especially after 2000, applied stale dogmas in conceptualizing the social transformation, instead of using new and creative approaches. New dogmas, mainly of neo-liberal provenience, are usually assigned to “econocrats” among experts, as well as to the part of political and economic elites. This proceeded, since the year 2000, from the domestic “interpreters” of “shock therapy” (an approach developed by Jeffrey Sachs), notably, in its “Serbian” version. Especially problematic was the imposition of the privatization model. What we have today is – a “second-rate, half-permeable liberalism” that creates huge numbers of social and economic problems, and which has so far resulted in „growth without development” and the largest deindustrialization among countries of former socialism/ communism. From 1990 till 2009, Serbia lost 601,000 industry workers. Serbia is a country of plundered economy, a society in anomy, with
impovery citizens and very tiny layer of wealthy people.

The global crisis has only made this state more complicated, and harder to resolve, particularly regarding high unemployment, poverty, social differentiation and polarization. Serbia is in a deep and comprehensive crisis, whose dimensions have been potentiated by the global crisis. There is not enough concrete and wide social dialogue about the way to get out of the crisis. Also, there is none of the kind of public mobilization which is needed to overcome the difficult circumstances. Instead, various feigned “discussions” and “strategies” are reduced to political marketing, improvisations and the like. The main question remains, whether the Serbian elites can meet the complexities both of the current situation and of future prospects, when they have been demonstrating inferiority and incompetence in strategic research.

3 Sustainability, territorial capital and spatial patterns

The state of Serbian territorial capital, which has significantly decreased over two or three decades, as have also its comparative advantages and concurrent ability, placing the country into the so-called “inner European periphery”; namely, in the circle of countries that possess significant differences between developed and undeveloped areas, especially between the metropolitan area and other regions, as well as significant regional fragmentation, as key attributes of their spatial structure [9]. Despite dynamic, but also insufficient and inadequate recovery, this capital also hasn’t been significantly restored during the period after 2000. Since the beginning of the 1990s all crucial social and economic indicators worsened, along with the majority of environmental indicators, so that the country, despite partial recovery, is still in a social, political and economic crisis with consequences on its environmental development.

For example, the dynamic economic growth during the period from 2000 onwards was achieved mainly as a result of the growing import of raw materials and durables, as well as the growth of activities which “service” import (i.e., infrastructure, trade, bank services, insurance services etc.). On the other hand, the “eco-eco” restructuring has been very modest and, over all, insufficient. Only a small part of revenues has been used for restructuring, while most has been used for different consumption models [10].

As for the specific aspects of sustainability of production, spatial and consuming patterns in growth and development, they are all poor, compared to the corresponding European averages, viz.: Serbia has the most unfavorable demographic structure and suffers from prolonged demographic recession, ranking among the 10 fastest ageing populations in the world, and suffering from enormous exodus of the most talented young people, ranking as the 4th worst in the world in that respect, all that paralleled by the largest number, both in absolute and relative terms, of refugees in Europe; the territorial differences in development of Serbian areas are among the largest in Europe: enormous are regional development differences (up to 30:1, GDP pc, municipal level, and 10:1, regional level NUTs 3), and the most endangered are remote rural areas, and/or the majority of border areas, and/or mountainous areas, which have been severely depopulated; a generally poor state of communal hygiene; the GDP per capita does not exceed ca. 3,500-4,000 euro, one of the lowest in Europe, paralleled by the next to lowest HDI among all European countries; the culture of construction (Baukultur) is extremely low, with a terrible spatial chaos, paralleling a huge extent of illegal construction (estimations go from 400,000 to 1,000,000); still relatively low level of urbanization; a large fall of GDP and industrial production from the end of 1980s/beginning of 1990s, now only partially recovered after 2000; low resource productivity as a consequence of an obsolete economic structure, paralleling a disproportionately large production of waste; a vast extent of areas polluted during the bombing in 1999, which haven’t been recovered; high water, land and air pollution, as compared to the development state reached; low share of renewable resources in the total amount of used resources is still pretty low, as well as the low share of low-carbon activities in the economy; relatively poor utilization of otherwise rich biodiversity; etc. [11].

Regarding the planning system, planning practice and “planning culture”, over the period of more than two decades there has been retrogression in terms of strategic thinking, research and governance. Until several dozens of national, regional and local development documents (strategies, plans, policies,
programs, strategic projects etc.) were adopted during the last couple of years, among reformers (in political and economic elites), an eminently anti-planning and anti-developing attitude dominated, rarely much different from open aversion towards any planning or other development steering (strategic thinking, research and governance, social mobilization etc.). Among the reformers dominated F. von Hayek’s construct on the importance of katalaxia, thereby neglecting the importance of new forms of planning and governance. In these questions ideological and political zealots dominated, mainly neo-liberal gurus, mostly local epigones of international gurus and vedettas, and often neophytes from the period of the “socialistic market economy” [1, 12].

Especially after 2000, the so-called “planning culture” [13] has experienced significant deterioration. Planning practice is not developing up to the ideals of the democratic, participative and emancipatory-modernizing model that aspires to communicative-collaborative planning as an asymptotic ideal. Instead, in practice manipulation, clientelism and paternalism dominate so-called “strategy of persuasion”, in the “enemy” model [14] (for some thoughts on the impact of the collapse of the planning system and practice, see e.g. [31]).

The existing system and planning practice are following, actually, the way of thinking in institutional and organizational adjustment of many decades, and large numbers of existing institutions are so-called “institutional zombies”. One new syndrome, the so-called “management-agency”, cannot be an adequate solution for the complex challenges of strategic thinking, research and governance in the 21st century. Planning legitimacy is low, and planning practice remains as part of a mixture of elements from different ‘models’ [15]:

- Planning as crisis management.
- Planning as a mechanism for rationalization and support of “uncontrolled privatization and wild marketization”, with the domination of big projects rather than strategic development frameworks and schemes.
- The least practiced, though, is that type of planning that is, otherwise, the most precious and needed, and that is the institutional frame and mechanism more accommodated to the needed social, economic, cultural and ecologically-spatial transformation in the transition period.

Consequently, in Serbia more options with regard to the institutional and organizational adjustment of regional development and governance should be taken into account and evaluated, especially pertaining to its decentralization, in order to initiate a broader public deliberation of this issue, possibly as follows [10]:

- Retain the existing arrangements (that is, all or some national, regional and local initiatives and schemes), without introducing any major change.
- Retain national planning policy only as a general strategic framework and a number of strategic frameworks or key projects, based on corresponding European development initiatives and schemes (that is, when decentralization is not possible and/or recommended).
- Discontinue the existing relative isolation from broader regional and European contexts, and, in general, introduce more European development categories, at all levels, and in all sectors.
- Retain the existing arrangements, also introducing more correspondence to the existing pan-European, EU and macro-regional development initiatives.
- Decentralize decision making to the regions, through more devolution of power, or through maintaining the dominance of the centre.
- Continue decentralization of decision making at the local government and community level, based on the plan-led system (socio-economic, spatial, environmental, etc.).
- Discontinue the existing practice, by encouraging new approaches in integrating bottom-up planning initiatives, and top-down guidance, all centered at two or more regional levels (see [29]).

In the part of the “Serbian spatial banana” that comprises the Belgrade and Novi Sad metropolitan area, on 6.67% Serbian territory is concentrated 2,054,341 population (27.1% of the total), 832,402 employees (41.6% of total), that realize 45.6% of national income [10, 16, 30].

Though the development gap between European regions is slowly shrinking and national differences diminishing, the differences between regions and cities mainly grow in parallel, especially after the recent enlargements of the Union (see [17]). This trend can be assumed in future Serbian spatial development. Market neoliberal policy has a tendency to enlarge spatial differences at the expense of undeveloped and more neglected regions, with unintentional polarization on all spatial levels.
4 Methodological approach to empiric evaluation of spatial development scenarios of Serbia in 2020

Recently a new Spatial development strategy of Serbia till 2021 [18] has been completed, also dealing with two scenarios of future development, viz.: “further growth recession, under crisis management”; and “sustainable spatial development”. Also, following the legal changes of 2009, a new national spatial plan has been completed, and now is discussed in the public at large. However, much more research of future development prospects is needed, vis-à-vis dire development fixities and givens. Namely, the Serbian “post-socialist Argonautics” has been facing a number of difficulties, also exacerbated by a lack of adequate institutional and organizational adjustments for strategic development governance [8].

The circumstances of political democratization, ownership privatization and the development of market institutions and mechanisms emphasize the importance of one of the key constants in strategic thinking, research and governance. Namely, there is almost no planning activity, rather, there are hardly any decisions beneficial for all, or equally beneficial for all (even if it is about a “planning game with a positive zero”, and especially in the case of a so-called game with constant/zero sum). This creates a new standpoint with regard to the traditional approaches and asks from planners and other experts to develop new approaches and methods, in order to envisage the spatial-urban community in advance – in an objectivised, organized and systematized way – along with the probable consequences of different alternative possibilities (decisions about the future). It is advisable to make potential positive and negative consequences explicit (reasons for and against, costs and benefits) for certain areas (i.e., from the standpoint of possible common/ public interests), and also for special territorial interest groups, although that is not always possible, mainly due to the lack of time, data and other resources. There are some particular reasons that support the necessity to apply alternative scenarios in Serbia.

Based on a number of introductory, [19,20,21] general theoretical and methodological comments on scenario planning, in the sequel few practical scenarios have been developed, within the framework of three basic scenario types:

- “Continuation of existing” - this scenario draws on what will likely happen if a community doesn’t start planning interventions and other decisions targeted to change current conditions and routine processes.
- “Ideal changes” – this scenario is maximalist in a way, but often draws out the best possibilities.
- “Rational and possible changes” refer to that complex of aims and tools whose application could lead to incremental changes for the better, in frames sketched by an “ideal” scenario. Combining the following methods, which comprise a mixture of elements from three approaches [22]:
  - Exploratory-anticipatory scenarios, that is, we start from the present and explore what consequences may result if certain events occur. Anticipatory scenarios describe a final state and speculate on what events are required to create it. Thereby, explanatory scenarios are forward-directed, i.e., they start from some known or assumed states or events and explore their predictable implications and consequences. The anticipatory scenarios are backward-directed, as they start from some assumed final state, and search, often by applying the so-called "backward mapping", for the possible preconditions which could produce these effects.
  - Descriptive-normative scenarios, that is, we start from insights into possible futures, by making no account of their (un)desirability, or to any normative demands, that is, on the basis of certain, often clearly explicated values and desirable goals.
  - Trend-peripheral, in which trends are projections based on the basis of known past events. Here, the peripheral scenarios are created to explore less probable futures, indicating a break in the stabilized chain of events.

The empirical evaluation of scenarios of spatial development of Serbia until 2020 has been conducted based on a comparative analysis of the indicators by Spider method for each scenario. The Spider model is an analytical tool used to compare and visualise relative advantages and shortcomings of a territory or of different development scenarios based on many factors [23]. The model represents a tool for presenting larger areas, or different development options, and provides an evaluation of suggested
development policies. The most common and broader model application in scenario analysis is in regional development, transport and metropolitan areas [24]. The method is based on the calculation and visualisation of expected changes, and Spider analysis enables the visualisation of extreme development routes, defined by different scenarios, as well as the exhibition of expected and wanted development options, through the standardisation of their relative preferences and weaknesses (“continuation of existing trends”, “ideal changes”, “rational, possible or expected changes”).

5 Evaluation Results and Discussion

To illustrate the Spider method, we present here the empiric results of evaluating three scenarios of Serbian spatial development until 2020:
- Scenario 1: “continuation of existing trends”;
- Scenario 2: “ideal changes”, on the road of sustainable territorial development; and
- Scenario 3: “cataclysmic” scenario of spatial development.

The empirical evaluation of three scenarios of spatial development of Serbia until 2020 has been based on a comparative analysis of the absolute and relative values of 29 indicators that were transformed into standardised Spider values for each scenario (Table 1, Graph 1).

In general, it has been demonstrated that, following the expected “natural” course of future events, it will be almost impossible for the undeveloped regions to realise faster growth, i.e., economic growth that is larger than the economic growth of the Belgrade or Novi Sad metropolitan areas – if appropriate, new regional/territorial development policies are not applied. Namely, it is hardly imaginable that, now dominating trend towards the stabilising of this “Serbian spatial banana”, may be reversed without a number of major development interventions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Status 2008.</th>
<th>Scenario 1</th>
<th>Scenario 2</th>
<th>Scenario 3</th>
<th>Status 2008.</th>
<th>Scenario 1</th>
<th>Scenario 2</th>
<th>Scenario 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (€)</td>
<td>4,597</td>
<td>8,469</td>
<td>8,985</td>
<td>5,592</td>
<td>5.11</td>
<td>9.42</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP/km² (in 000 €)</td>
<td>441.4</td>
<td>725.4</td>
<td>843.5</td>
<td>469.19</td>
<td>5.24</td>
<td>8.59</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour productivity per employed person</td>
<td>17,137</td>
<td>28,820</td>
<td>29,704</td>
<td>20,194</td>
<td>5.76</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population density</td>
<td>94.66</td>
<td>85.64</td>
<td>93.87</td>
<td>83.9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9.04</td>
<td>9.91</td>
<td>8.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index of ageing</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.092</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>1.092</td>
<td>8.24</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8.05</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% households with internet access</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>4.74</td>
<td>5.71</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP/CO₂ (€ /t)</td>
<td>643.3</td>
<td>1055.2</td>
<td>1333.7</td>
<td>682</td>
<td>4.82</td>
<td>7.91</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emission of CO₂ (t/capita)</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>8.02</td>
<td>6.73</td>
<td>8.19</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The rate of motorisation (number of vehicles/1000 capita)</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>8.57</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8.85</td>
<td>7.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of inhabitants in 000</td>
<td>7,334</td>
<td>6,635.3</td>
<td>7,272.9</td>
<td>6,500</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9.04</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>8.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of built area</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households with sewage system (%)</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>5.29</td>
<td>6.15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5.38</td>
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<tr>
<td>The share of investments in GDP (%)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3.2</td>
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<td>Investments per capita (€)</td>
<td>840</td>
<td>844</td>
<td>2245</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investments in research and development (as % of GDP)</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The share of export in GDP (%)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6.66</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export per capita (€)</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>2,532</td>
<td>4,042</td>
<td>1,107</td>
<td>5.52</td>
<td>6.26</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% population with high education</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3.72</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External debt (% GDP)</td>
<td>63.6</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>6.36</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Graph 1. Comparative analysis and review of indicators of sustainable development scenarios for Serbia in 2020 (values gained by applying the *Spider* method).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>State 2008</th>
<th>Scenario 1</th>
<th>Scenario 2</th>
<th>Scenario 3</th>
<th>EU-27 average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate (%)</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanisation level (%)</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>7.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households with access to drinking water (%)</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>9.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protected area (% of total)</td>
<td>8.45</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6.19</td>
<td>6.19</td>
<td>8.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest area (% of total)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>8.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal waste generated (kg/capita)</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>7.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumption of energy from renewable sources, including big HPP (% from total consumption)</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>34.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEI (water exploitation index)</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>9.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of population suffering from excess of daily concentration of SO₂ over 125μg/m³</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of population suffering from excess of daily concentration of NO₂ over 40μg/m³</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Graph 1 presents results of the comparative analysis of relative and standardised *Spider* values of chosen indicators for Serbia, while Graph 2 presents relative and standardised *Spider* values of chosen indicators for Serbia and for the EU-27 average in 2008.
Regarding the estimation of the type of transitional reformations that need to be implemented in the future period (continued transition), at least three scenarios are possible [8]:

- “Remaining at the ‘inner European periphery’”: prolonging the status of “economic and environmental colony”, and now also ”financial and debtor colony”.
- “Development of modern, just and spatially balanced society”. Though this scenario is the most desired from the standpoint of the long term interests of the majority of individuals, social groups and society as a whole, on the short and mid-term it has the least possibility, given the ecological, spatial, urban and social sustainable economy and society.

Further work on the predictable scenarios would be in place regarding the integration of Serbia in broader Balkan space. Pertinent scenarios should cover a range of options, from a soft cooperation of Balkan countries in specific issues, via stronger coordination of national sector policies (viz., environmental, technical infrastructure, and similar) [10], to more integrated national strategic schemes within – preferably – a common strategy of sustainable spatial development of the Balkans, an idea which was put fort some ten years ago. This has already been indicated in [25], but has not been achieved later, to be renewed in the latest period by two Greek scientists-regionalists [26]. Maybe the first steps in that direction have already been made in May 2008, when as a part of the IPA Programme, the first invitation for projects in the Programme of transborder cooperation of SEE countries (second call was opened in late December 2009). In the Programme participate Albania, Austria, BJR Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Hungary, Moldavia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia, Slovakia and Romania, as well as some parts of Italy and Ukraine.

The main aim of transborder cooperation is exactly the support to balanced development and territorial integration of South Eastern Europe area. Starting from larger number of the latest EU documents, development of partnerships in the questions of strategic importance for spatial,
economic and social integration, as well as achieving cohesion, stability and competition, were established as the main aim of Programme. The support was foreseen in four areas: 1) Development of innovative approaches and entrepreneurship; 2) Risk prevention in environment protection: integrated water management and transnational flood prevention; management of natural resources and protected areas; energy efficiency and consumption; etc.; 3) Accessibility promotion: coordination in planning of primary and secondary transport networks; strategy development for overcoming so called “digital division jaz“ (solving main urban problems; etc.; and 4) Development of transnational cooperation for establishing sustainable development: solving main problems that threaten urban areas and regional settlements netwok; promotion of balanced accessibility to main development areas; promotion of using cultural assets in development projects.

6 Conclusions
The analysis indicated poor prospects for further Serbian development, if it continues with the currently dominant pattern of growth and development. Along with that, it is indicated that there is necessity for more detailed elaboration of this issue through the combined application of further approaches/scenarios. Consequently, further research is needed, to be focused on the number of new scenarios introduced.

Regarding the development scenarios in the spatial-urban-ecological sense proper, defining a preliminary evaluation of scenarios provides a full sense of important spatial-urban-ecological categories, such as the above-mentioned [8]: “territorial-spatial balance”; “spatial concentration and polarization”; “spatial fragmentation”; “spatial integration”; “urban structure”; “spreading of the periphery of cities and towns”; “spatial distribution of population and activities”; “territorial capital”; “concentration, or dispersal of public services”; “ecological regimes in space usage”, etc. These elements need to be combined with elements from different commonalities and transitional scenarios and thus conduct an appropriate ex ante evaluation.

The continuation of this research by application of larger number of development scenarios could significantly contribute to revival of strategic thinking, research and governance, which seems as a necessary precondition for establishment of wider professional and political dialogue on getting out from the existing crisis, as well as on solving the key development questions.

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