

Theoretical and Practical Aspects for Study and Optimization of the Aircrafts' Electro Energetic Systems

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Abstract: - The paper presents a concrete case of an actual aircraft electric power system analysis. Using the Boolean logical structures we define a conceptual fault tree. The fault tree will express all the combination of factors that can lead to system failure in the onboard electric system. The further on analysis rely on AND – OR logic elements, and the goal is to improve the fault-tolerance behavior of the system. The examples and numeric figures are for a c.c. electric power system of an operational aircraft.

Key-Words: - reliability analysis, Boolean logic, aircraft, electric power, energetic system.

1 Introduction

Large-scale systems reliability analysis is based on the quantification of the failure process at the structural level. Thus, any system failure is a result of a quantified sequence of states of the failure process. The quantification level is chosen in accordance with the desired goal and precision, down even to the singular components. The more detailed the quantification level gets, the more accurate are the results [1], [2], [15].

The conceptual representation of an emergent failure state is a series of primary events, interconnected through a Boolean logical structure, which indicates the possible combination of those elements having the result of a system failure. The aircraft electric system reliability determination, using the Boolean algebra, consists in the calculus of the probability of the “failure” event.

From the structural point of view, for the reliability analysis, we will use the terms:

- Primary elements – components or blocks at the

base level of the quantification;

- Primary failures – primary elements failures;
- Unwanted event – system failure state;
- Failure mode – the set of primary elements that when simultaneously in failure mode, drives to a system failure;
- Minimal failure mode – the smallest set of primary components that when simultaneously in failure mode, drive to a system failure;
- Hierarchic level – all elements that are structurally equivalent and having equivalent positions in the system failure representation.

The analysis method is based on binary logic [3], [4], [5]. Thus, a system function is equivalent with a binary function, which variables are the events (the failures). This binary function:

$$Y = f(X_1, X_2, \dots, X_n) \quad (1)$$

is synthesized with logical elements AND/OR, using the following symbols and states:

∪ (reunion) for the function OR;

\cap (intersection) for the function AND;

X_i is 1 if the primary element is good and 0 otherwise, and Y is 1 if the system is good and 0 otherwise. Thus, the method representation is depicted in Figure 1.




Fig.1. a) The general concept of the method based on Boolean algebra (1, 2,..., n are independent primary events); b) the schematics of the logic function AND; c) the schematics of the logic function OR

For the reliability function indicators calculus, in the hypothesis of the failure intensity having an exponential distribution, we use the relations:

$$R(t) = \exp\left(-\sum_{i=1}^n \lambda_i t\right) = \exp(-\wedge t) \quad (2)$$

$$R(t) = 1 - \prod_{i=1}^n [1 - \exp(\lambda_i t)] \quad (3)$$

where: $\wedge = \sum_{i=1}^n \lambda_i$.

Relation (2) is used for the serial connection and the relation (3) is used for the parallel connection of the elements.

2 The Analysis Method Application

In the purpose of exemplifying the method for the reliability indicators determination we will focus on the c.c. electric power supply system of an aircraft. Figure 2 depicts the electric power supply system for the aircraft [10], [11], [12].

In principle, this electric power supply system equips (as the main electric power supply system) a large number of military aircraft from the MiG family (MiG-21, MiG-23, MiG-27, etc.). The example refers only a c.c. electric power supply system, but the method can be used also for the alternative current, mixed and complex systems [7], [8], [9], [13], [14]. In Figure 2:

1E – starter-generator [11], [12] – startup time of several seconds (as starter), after a successful start (three attempts permitted) it goes to a generator regime, supplying a 28V c.c. voltage;

4E – accumulator switch;

5E – inverse polarity protection diode;

13E – accumulator;

14E – accumulator to c.c. bar switch;

24E – generator to c.c. bar coupler / de-coupler;

47E – fuse;

27E – voltage regulator.

The emerging failure state schematics using AND/OR elements is depicted in Figure 3. The failure event is the loss of voltage at the 28V bar.

For the failure intensity λ_i of the components we use the relation:

$$\lambda_i = k\lambda_0 \quad (4)$$

where:

k – maintenance and way – of – use coefficient (for aircraft components the coefficient varies between 120 and 160 [6]); λ_0 – failure intensity – manufacturer specific data.

The data relative to the electric power supply system are presented in Table 1.

In these conditions, the Boolean function associated to the logic structure depicted in Figure 3 has the following form:

$$Y = X_7 \cap X_{12} = (X_1 \cup X_2 \cup X_3 \cup X_4 \cup X_5 \cup X_6) \cap (X_8 \cup X_9 \cup X_{10} \cup X_{11}) \quad (5)$$

To transform the logic expression into algebraic form [3], [4], [10] we use the following relations:

$$X_1 \cap X_2 = X_1 \cdot X_2, \quad X_1 \cup X_2 = X_1 + X_2 - X_1 X_2, \quad \bigcup_{i=1}^n X_i = 1 - \prod_{i=1}^n (1 - X_i) \quad (6)$$

Thus, we have:

$$Y = X_7 \cdot X_{12} = [1 - (1 - X_1)(1 - X_2)(1 - X_3)(1 - X_4)(1 - X_5)(1 - X_6)] \cdot [1 - (1 - X_8)(1 - X_9)(1 - X_{10})(1 - X_{11})]$$

which is similar to

$$Y = X_7 \cdot X_{12} = \left[1 - \prod_{i=1}^6 (1 - X_i)\right] \cdot \left[1 - \prod_{k=8}^{11} (1 - X_k)\right] \quad (8)$$

Considering the failure intensity as exponential distribution, the system failure probability:

$$F(t) = \{1 - \exp[-(\lambda_1 + \lambda_2 + \lambda_3 + \lambda_4 + \lambda_5 + \lambda_6)t]\} \cdot [1 - \exp(-\lambda_8 - \lambda_9 - \lambda_{10} - \lambda_{11})t] = 1 - \exp\left[-\sum_{i=8}^{11} \lambda_i t\right] - \exp\left[-\sum_{k=1}^6 \lambda_k t\right] + \exp\left[-\sum_{\substack{p=1 \\ p \neq 7}}^{11} \lambda_p t\right] \quad (9)$$

Thus,

$$R(t) = 1 - F(t) = \exp\left[-\sum_{i=8}^{11} \lambda_i t\right] + \exp\left[-\sum_{k=1}^6 \lambda_k t\right] - \exp\left[-\sum_{\substack{p=1 \\ p \neq 7}}^{11} \lambda_p t\right] \quad (10)$$

The mean time between failure (*MTBF*) is [12], [13]

$$\begin{aligned}
 MTBF &= \int_0^{\infty} R(t) dt = \frac{1}{\sum_{i=8}^{11} \lambda_i t} + \frac{1}{\sum_{k=1}^6 \lambda_k t} - \frac{1}{\sum_{p=1}^{11} \lambda_p t} = \\
 &= \frac{1}{(96 + 4 + 208 + 16) \cdot 10^{-5}} + \\
 &+ \frac{1}{(1.92 + 9.6 + 22.4 + 6.4 + 44 + 16) \cdot 10^{-5}} + \\
 &+ \frac{1}{(1.92 + 9.6 + 22.4 + 6.4 + 44 + 16 + 96 + 4 + 208 + 16) \cdot 10^{-5}}.
 \end{aligned}
 \tag{11}$$

On results *MTBF* = 1069,79.

Thus, mean time between failure for the non improved system may be approximated as follows *MTBF* \cong 1070 hours.




Fig.2. The electric power supply schematics for a c.c. main electric supply system aircraft (fragment)

Table 1

Symbol	Description	λ_0 [h ⁻¹]	Number	k	$\lambda_i = nk\lambda_0$ [h ⁻¹]	$F_i = 1 - e^{-\lambda_i t}$
4E	Switch	$0.12 \cdot 10^{-6}$	1	160	$\lambda_1 = 1.92 \cdot 10^{-5}$	$F_1 = 1 - e^{-1.92 \cdot 10^{-5} t}$
5E	Diode	$0.6 \cdot 10^{-6}$	1	160	$\lambda_1 = 9.6 \cdot 10^{-5}$	$F_2 = 1 - e^{-9.6 \cdot 10^{-5} t}$
13E	Accumulator	$1.4 \cdot 10^{-6}$	1	160	$\lambda_1 = 22.4 \cdot 10^{-5}$	$F_3 = 1 - e^{-22.4 \cdot 10^{-5} t}$
14E	Coupler	$0.4 \cdot 10^{-6}$	1	160	$\lambda_1 = 6.4 \cdot 10^{-5}$	$F_4 = 1 - e^{-6.4 \cdot 10^{-5} t}$
47E	Fuse	$2.75 \cdot 10^{-6}$	1	160	$\lambda_1 = 44 \cdot 10^{-5}$	$F_5 = 1 - e^{-44 \cdot 10^{-5} t}$
-	Contacts 1	$0.1 \cdot 10^{-6}$	1	160	$\lambda_1 = 16 \cdot 10^{-5}$	$F_6 = 1 - e^{-16 \cdot 10^{-5} t}$
1E	Starter- generator	$6 \cdot 10^{-6}$	1	160	$\lambda_1 = 96 \cdot 10^{-5}$	$F_8 = 1 - e^{-96 \cdot 10^{-5} t}$
24E	Coupler / De-coupler	$0.25 \cdot 10^{-6}$	1	160	$\lambda_1 = 4 \cdot 10^{-5}$	$F_9 = 1 - e^{-4 \cdot 10^{-5} t}$
27E	Voltage regulator	$13 \cdot 10^{-6}$	1	160	$\lambda_1 = 208 \cdot 10^{-5}$	$F_{10} = 1 - e^{-208 \cdot 10^{-5} t}$
-	Contacts 1	$0.1 \cdot 10^{-6}$	1	160	$\lambda_1 = 16 \cdot 10^{-5}$	$F_{11} = 1 - e^{-16 \cdot 10^{-5} t}$




Fig.3. The logic structure that drives to the system failure status.




Fig.4. Electric power supply system including the back-up subsystem (fragment)

Table 2

Symbol	Description	λ_0 [h ⁻¹]	Number	k	$\lambda_i = nk\lambda_0$ [h ⁻¹]	$F_i = 1 - e^{-\lambda_i t}$
60E	Coupler	$0.4 \cdot 10^{-6}$	1	160	$\lambda_1 = 6.4 \cdot 10^{-5}$	$F_1 = 1 - e^{-6.4 \cdot 10^{-5} t}$
61E	Switch	$0.12 \cdot 10^{-6}$	1	160	$\lambda_1 = 1.92 \cdot 10^{-5}$	$F_2 = 1 - e^{-1.92 \cdot 10^{-5} t}$
-	Contacts 3	$0.1 \cdot 10^{-6}$	4	160	$\lambda_1 = 6.4 \cdot 10^{-5}$	$F_3 = 1 - e^{-6.4 \cdot 10^{-5} t}$

$$\begin{aligned}
 R(t) = & \exp\left(-\sum_{i=13}^{15} \lambda_i t\right) + \exp\left(-\sum_{k=1}^6 \lambda_k t\right) + \\
 & + \exp\left(-\sum_{p=8}^{11} \lambda_p t\right) - \exp\left(-\sum_{\substack{i=1 \\ i \neq 7}}^{11} \lambda_i t\right) - \\
 & - \exp\left(-\sum_{\substack{i=1 \\ i \neq 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12}}^{15} \lambda_i t\right) + \exp\left(-\sum_{\substack{i=1 \\ i \neq 7 \\ i \neq 12}}^{15} \lambda_i t\right) - \\
 & - \exp\left(-\sum_{\substack{i=8 \\ i \neq 12}}^{15} \lambda_i t\right).
 \end{aligned} \tag{16}$$

For the *MTBF*, we will have [10]:

$$\begin{aligned}
 MTBF = \int_0^{\infty} R(t) dt = & \frac{1}{\sum_{i=13}^{15} \lambda_i} + \frac{1}{\sum_{k=1}^6 \lambda_k} + \frac{1}{\sum_{p=8}^{11} \lambda_p} - \\
 & - \frac{1}{\sum_{\substack{i=1 \\ i \neq 7}}^{11} \lambda_i} - \frac{1}{\sum_{\substack{i=1 \\ i \neq 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12}}^{15} \lambda_i} + \frac{1}{\sum_{\substack{i=1 \\ i \neq 7 \\ i \neq 12}}^{15} \lambda_i} - \frac{1}{\sum_{\substack{i=8 \\ i \neq 12}}^{15} \lambda_i} \cong 6926.
 \end{aligned} \tag{17}$$

Thus, using the back-up subsystem, we increased the system reliability. The reservation efficiency [2], [6] we have:

$$\gamma = \frac{(MTBF)_r}{(MTBF)_0} = \frac{6926}{1070} \cong 6.5. \tag{18}$$

4 Influence of *k* Coefficient on *MTBF*

Taking into account the system failure probability's expressions - *F(t)* and reliability *R(t)* for schemes from fig.2 and fig.4 one makes the Matlab program presented in Appendix. Using this program one obtains time evolutions of variables *F* and *R*.




Fig.6. System failure probability for different values of *k* (initial system)

Coefficient *k* from equation (4) has the starting

value *k* = 160. For this value one calculated *MTBF* both for initial system (fig.2) and improved system (fig.4). Matlab program makes a complex analysis of the influence of coefficient *k* on system failure probability, system's reliability and *MTBF*.

In fig.6 and fig.7 time characteristics *F(t)* and *R(t)*, for different values of coefficient *k*, are presented: *k* = 120 (blue), *k* = 130 (red), *k* = 140 (black), *k* = 150 (magenta) and *k* = 160 (green).

As can be seen, the increase of *k* is direct proportional with function *F(t)* and inverse proportional with reliability *R(t)*.




Fig.7. System's reliability for different values of *k* (initial system)




Fig.8. *MTBF* for different values of *k* (initial system)

Mean time between failure (*MTBF*) of the system is bigger for small values of coefficient *k*. There is an inverse proportionality relationship between the two variables (fig.8). The obtained values both for initial

system and improved system are presented in Table 3. One also makes the same analysis of the improved system (fig.4). The conclusions are the same. The graphic characteristics are the ones from fig. 9-11.




Fig.9. System failure probability for different values of k (improved system)




Fig.10. System's reliability for different values of k (improved system)

Comparative analysis of the two systems' reliability for different values of k is made in fig.12 (for initial system one uses the blue color and red color for the improved system)




Fig.11. $MTBF$ for different values of k (improved system)




Fig.12. Comparative analysis of the two systems' reliability for different values of k

For the five values of coefficient k , the improved system using a redundant (reserve) subsystem is characterized by superior values of $MTBF$ in rapport with the values corresponding to the initial system (fig.13). In fig.13 the evolution of $MTBF$ for the initial system is represented with dashed line, while the evolution of $MTBF$ for the improved system is represented with continuous line.

Table 3

$MTBF$ for different k	$k = 120$	$k = 130$	$k = 140$	$k = 150$	$k = 160$
Initial system (fig.3)	1426.4 hours	1316.7 hours	1222.6 hours	1141.1 hours	1069.8 hours
Improved system (fig.4)	9.2354 hours	8.5250 hours	7.9160 hours	7.3883 hours	6.9265 hours
$\gamma = \frac{(MTBF)_r}{(MTBF)_0}$	6.4746	6.4745	6.4747	6.4747	6.4746




Fig.13. Evolutions of *MTBF* for the two systems

Thus, $\gamma \cong ct$. indifferent of k 's values.

5 Appendix

close all;

clear all;

% BEFORE OPTIMIZING

t=1:8000; **% Time [hours]**

landa0=[0.12 0.6 1.4 0.4 2.75 0.1*10 6 0.25 13

0.1*10]/1000000;

SUM=0;

for i=1:length(landa0)

SUM=SUM+landa0(i);

end

k=[120 130 140 150 160];

for i=1:length(k)

landai(i,:)=landa0*k(i);

S(i)=SUM*k(i);

end

for i=1:length(k)

F(i,:)=1-exp(-(landai(i,7)+landai(i,8)+landai(i,9)+
+landai(i,10))*t)-exp(-(landai(i,1)+landai(i,2)+
+landai(i,3)+landai(i,4)+landai(i,5)+landai(i,6))*t)+
+exp(-S(i)*t);

R(i,:)=1-F(i,:);

MTBF1(i)=1/(landai(i,7)+landai(i,8)+landai(i,9)+
+landai(i,10))+1/(landai(i,1)+landai(i,2)+landai(i,3)+
+landai(i,4)+landai(i,5)+landai(i,6))-1/S(i);

end

plot(t,F(1,:), 'b'); grid;

xlabel('Time [hours]');

ylabel('Damage probability of the system');

hold on;

plot(t,F(2,:), 'r'); hold on;

plot(t,F(3,:), 'k'); hold on;

plot(t,F(4,:), 'm'); hold on;

plot(t,F(5,:), 'g');

title('Damage probability of the system for different values of k')

h=figure;

plot(t,R(1,:), 'b'); grid;

xlabel('Time [hours]');

ylabel('Fiability of the system');

hold on; plot(t,R(2,:), 'r');

hold on; plot(t,R(3,:), 'k');

hold on; plot(t,R(4,:), 'm');

hold on; plot(t,R(5,:), 'g');

title('Fiability of the system for different values of k')

% AFTER OPTIMIZING

landa0p=[0.12 0.6 1.4 0.4 2.75 0.1*10 6 0.25 13
0.1*10 0.4 0.12 0.1*4]/1000000;

SUMp=0;

for i=1:length(landa0p)

SUMp=SUMP+landa0p(i);

end

kp=k;

for i=1:length(kp)

landaip(i,:)=landa0p*kp(i);

Sp(i)=SUMp*kp(i);

end

for i=1:length(kp)

Fp(i,:)=1-exp(-(landaip(i,11)+landaip(i,12)+
+andaip(i,13))*t)-exp(-(landaip(i,1)+landaip(i,2)+
+andaip(i,3)+landaip(i,4)+landaip(i,5)+
+andaip(i,6))*t)-exp(-(landaip(i,7)+landaip(i,8)+
+andaip(i,9)+landaip(i,10))*t)+exp(-S(i)*t)+
+exp(-(Sp(i)-landaip(i,7)-landaip(i,8)-andaip(i,9)-
-andaip(i,10))*t)-exp(-Sp(i)*t)+exp(-andaip(i,7)+
+andaip(i,8)+landaip(i,9)+landaip(i,10)+
+andaip(i,11)+landaip(i,12)+landaip(i,13))*t);

Rp(i,:)=1-Fp(i,:);

MTBF2(i)=1/(landaip(i,11)+landaip(i,12)+
+andaip(i,13))+1/(landaip(i,1)+landaip(i,2)+
+landaip(i,3)+landaip(i,4)+landaip(i,5)+
+andaip(i,6))+1/(landaip(i,7)+landaip(i,8)+
+landaip(i,9)+landaip(i,10))-1/S(i)-1/(Sp(i)-
-landaip(i,7)-landaip(i,8)-landaip(i,9)-
-landaip(i,10))-1/Sp(i)-1/(landaip(i,7)+
+landaip(i,8)+landaip(i,9)+landaip(i,10)+
+landaip(i,11)+landaip(i,12)+landaip(i,13));

end

h=figure;

plot(t,Fp(1,:), 'b'); grid;

xlabel('Time [hours]');

ylabel('Damage probability of the system');

hold on; plot(t,Fp(2,:), 'r');

hold on; plot(t,Fp(3,:), 'k');

hold on; plot(t,Fp(4,:), 'm');

hold on; plot(t,Fp(5,:), 'g');

title('Damage probability of the system for different values of k')

h=figure;


```

plot(t,Rp(1,:), 'b');grid;
xlabel('Time [hours]');
ylabel('Fiability of the system');
hold on; plot(t,Rp(2,:), 'r');
hold on; plot(t,Rp(3,:), 'k');
hold on; plot(t,Rp(4,:), 'm');
hold on; plot(t,Rp(5,:), 'g');
title('Fiability of the system for different values of k')
h=figure;
plot(k,MTBF2);grid;
xlabel('Constant k');
ylabel('Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF)');
title('Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) for
different values of k');
hold on;
plot(k,MTBF2, '*r');
% COMPARATIVE GRAPHICS (BEFORE AND
AFTER OPTIMIZING)
h=figure;
subplot(2,2,1);
plot(t,R(2,:), 'b', t,Rp(2,:), 'r');grid;
xlabel('Time [hours]');
ylabel('Fiability');
title('Fiability of the system before and after
optimizing (k=130)');
subplot(2,2,2);
plot(t,R(3,:), 'b', t,Rp(3,:), 'r');grid;
xlabel('Time [hours]');
ylabel('Fiability');
title('Fiability of the system before and after
optimizing (k=140)');
subplot(2,2,3);
plot(t,R(4,:), 'b', t,Rp(4,:), 'r');grid;
xlabel('Time [hours]');
ylabel('Fiability');
title('Fiability of the system before and after
optimizing (k=150)');
subplot(2,2,4);
plot(t,R(5,:), 'b', t,Rp(5,:), 'r');grid;
xlabel('Time [hours]');
ylabel('Fiability');
title('Fiability of the system before and after
optimizing (k=160)');
h=figure
plot(k,MTBF1, '*r', kp, MTBF2, 'or');grid;
xlabel('Constant k');
ylabel('Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF)');
title('Mean Time Between Failure before and after
optimizing');
hold on; plot(k,MTBF1, '-b', kp, MTBF2, 'b');

```

6 Conclusions

From the analyzed example, we can conclude that this method can be used in the onboard electric

power supply reliability determination. The *MTBF* influencing parameters in the main system points (power supply bars and distribution panels) can be determined and analyzed.

Through the failure related logic function analysis we can determine the circuits that can improve the system reliability. In the concrete case, through the introduction of the components 60E, 61E and corresponding contacts, we obtained a substantial increase of the reliability (approximately 6 times higher) for the 28V c.c. power supply bar.

One also made a complex analysis of the influence of coefficient k on system failure probability, system's reliability and *MTBF*. One can also noticed that the increase of k is direct proportional with function $F(t)$ and inverse proportional with reliability $R(t)$.

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